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PLUTARCH’S HEROES AND THE ‘BIOGRAPHICAL SYNECDOCHE’* 
 
“Boswell,” Sunny said.  
She meant something along the lines of “Your life doesn’t interest me.” 
Lemony Snicket, A Series of Unfortunate Events, Book 13 (2006), ch.7 
 
In Lemony Snicket’s surreal tale Sunny Baudelaire is a bright and brave toddler who 
cannot yet speak in sentences, but only in single words. Each word she utters, however, is 
typically laden with cultural memories and ironic provocations, which are coyly spelled out by 
the narrator. Thus the name of James Boswell (1740-1795) is used not just to convey 
depreciation of Boswell’s writing, but perhaps also to query the overall relevance of classic 
biographical narratives such as his Life of Samuel Johnson. The mention of a famous name can 
do two things at once: it can both recall the career and achievements of a specific individual 
and signal a larger phenomenon (here a strand1 of the Anglophone literary tradition). 
This paper will first address Plutarch’s tendency to frame comments on statesmanship 
and/or moral issues through compact onomastic references to notable figures of the Greek and 
Roman past. Many of the passages where Plutarch behaves like a grown up, serious version of 
Sunny Baudelaire are found within his Lives (although not exclusively there). So the stakes are 
higher for Plutarch, because nominatim references to widely-known historical characters cannot 
help being pregnant with further biographical textuality. Some owners of these names are 
themselves protagonists in Plutarchan Lives, while others are biographically significant at the 
level of anecdotes and exempla2 . A second topic of the paper will be Plutarch’s equally 
prominent habit of cross-referencing famous persons by means of very brief summations of the 
                                               
* I am grateful to Francis and Sandra Cairns for their wise, firm, and patient editorial 
guidance. I am also indebted, as so often, to Christopher Pelling’s valuable suggestions; any 
remaining errors and flaws are entirely my own. Unless noted otherwise, translations are 
from the Loeb Classical Library, although often modified towards greater literalness. 
 
1 Which is thoroughly influenced by the Plutarchan life writing: Gippert (2004). 
2 On the mutual osmosis between exempla, anecdotes and biographical literature in antiquity, 
see below, Section II. 
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salient points of their life stories. Analysis of the Plutarchan practice of condensing lives into 
onomastic tags or minimalist summations will open up fundamental questions about his 
approach to biography. I shall use the term ‘biographical synecdoche’ as a shorthand way of 
describing his invocations and synopses of famous Greek and Roman personalities; the idea  of 
selection inherent in synecdoche3 promises fresh insight into the dynamic complexity of 
Plutarch’s concerns with the past as a matrix of ethico-political values. At the end of the day, 
‘biographical synecdoche’ is a heuristic tool that will serve to demonstrate how full-scale 
biographical individuation, which is what each Plutarchan Life appears to offer in abundance, 
co-exists with and draws upon other discursive modes of processing biographical identities. 
Needless to say, within the space of a short paper it is only possible to tentatively broach such a 
weighty and ramified topic; more exhaustive discussion must await its time. 
 
 
I 
To begin with a straightforward example of Plutarch’s biographical synecdoche: in 
the stand-alone Life of Artaxerxes the conduct and policies of the Spartan statesman 
Antalcidas are criticised as reckless and corrupt. During his mission to Persia he effectively 
betrayed the benchmarks of Spartan leadership. 
ἦν δ' ὡς ἔοικεν ἐπιτήδειος οὗτος ἐντρυφηθῆναι ... ἐξορχησάμενος ἐν Πέρσαις τὸν Λεωνίδαν 
καὶ τὸν Καλλικρατίδαν. 
This man was obviously prone to wallow in luxury... having danced away Leonidas and 
Callicratidas among the Persians. (Artaxerxes 22.3) 
 
                                               
3 The distinction between synecdoche and metonymy continues to be debated by linguists: 
see esp. Nerlich and Clarke (1999); Nerlich (2010); Whitsitt (2013); Matzner (2016), 154-65. 
The most incisive attempt to disambiguate synecdoche from metonymy is Seto (1999); 
modern treatments have progressed far beyond the ancient (again, not altogether uniform) 
understanding of synecdoche vis-à-vis metaphor; see Lausberg (1960), 292-8.  
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Antalcidas’s misbehaviour4 ruins the image of Sparta evoked by the names of two of its 
paradigmatic heroes. Plutarch is patently selective: the list could have included  different 
names, or indeed more than two names. The names he opted for constitute, in any case, a 
synecdoche of the ‘normative’ Spartan past. But for Leonidas and Callicratidas to be valid 
synecdochic emblems of Sparta, their biographical profiles ought to be, at least momentarily, 
activated in the readers’ memory. And Plutarch perhaps aims for more than rudimentary 
biographical awareness, since he does  envisage  writing a Life of Leonidas: ἐν τῷ Λεωνίδου 
βίῳ γραφήσεται (De Herodoti Malignitate 866B). 5  
In the passage above biographical synecdoche materialises as  two names in the 
singular. But much more often Plutarchan biographees are assessed against (in)famous 
individuals whose names are pluralised. B  A comparison between the Life’s protagonist and 
an entire generation of his contemporaries or predecessors may call for a cluster of well-
known names in the plural form.  
... but he [Pericles] was leader for forty years among Ephialtuses and Leocrateses, 
Myronideses and Cimons and Tolmideses and Thucydideses... (Pericles 16.3) 
 
Aristides’ claim on the second place is contested by Sophaneses and Ameiniases and 
Callimachuses and Cynegeiruses, who fought with conspicious valour in those contests 
(Comparison of Aristides and Cato 2.2; trans. D. Sansone)6 
                                               
4 According to Van den Hout (1999) 566, the verb ἐξορχέομαι in Greek literature connotes 
debasement of the sacred rites. Yet in Plutarch’s De Herodoti Malignitate 867B the verb is 
linked with an allusion to the antics of Hippocleides (Hdt. 6.129), and so suggests general 
wantonness. 
5 Cf. Muccioli (2012) 138-40 for convincing speculation about how the Life of Leonidas 
would have been put together. 
6 Also Comparison of Aristides and Cato 1.3-4: “... the political life of Rome, which was no 
longer the work of Curii and Fabricii and Atilii as leaders, and which no longer welcomed as 
officeholders and popular leaders poor men who worked their fields with their own hands and 
who mounted the speaker’s platform straight from the plough and the hoe. The state had 
become accustomed to heed great families and wealth and largesses and ambitious election 
campaigns. ... To have as your opponent Themistocles, who was not distinguished by birth 
and whose wealth was modest... was not the same as contending for supremacy with 
Scipiones Africani and Servii Galbae and Quinctii Flamininii...”  (trans. D. Sansone, 
modified) 
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For even earlier than these events [the deeds of Pompey and Cassius], Cinnas and Marii and 
Carbones set up their country as prize and booty and almost openly waged war to gain a 
tyranny. But Brutus, it is said, was not accused of this even by his enemies (Brutus 29.6-7) 
 
If need be, a hero could be evaluated against the synecdochically sampled generation of his 
counterpart within the pair of Parallel Lives: 
... he [Crassus] was competing, not with Cleons and Hyperboluses – oh no, but with Caesar’s 
brilliance and Pompey’s three triumphs. (Comparison of Nicias and Crassus 2.4) 
 
Plutarch relies on a similar strategy  when making comparisons in historically themed 
declamations. In order to set up a foil for his main subject, he lists famous persons as 
representative specimens.  
... compare Alexander’s pupils with those of Plato and Socrates. <...> But Critiases and 
Alcibiadeses and Cleitophons spat out reason like the bit of the bridle, and have gone astray. 
(De Alexandri Fortuna 328B-C) 
 
For other men who are reported to have attained divine marriages and to have been paramours 
of goddesses – Peleuses and Anchiseses and Orions and Emathions – lived their lives not in 
an altogether cordial and painless manner. Numa, on the other hand, apparently had Good 
Fortune as his true spouse, coadjutor, and colleague in government. (De Fortuna Romanorum 
321C) 
 
 
It is clear that Plutarch has a penchant for synopsisising the political climate-cum-
ethos  of  whole generation by means of a handful of pluralised names of prominent 
statesmen or celebrated warriors. In a more panoramic survey of (Roman) history, names in 
the plural may alternate with names in the singular,7 with the same effect of synecdochic 
sampling. 
                                               
7 The plural names in these passages can be ‘genuine’ plurals that form a mini-catalogue of 
the famous republican clans: so Pelling (2011a) 208; Plutarch obviously uses the plural 
onomastic form when talking about Roman families ( e.g. Cic. 1.5; De fort. Rom. 325F). 
Alternatively, the juxtaposition of the plurals with names in the singular might be a clue that 
Plutarch is in fact  pluralising names of particularly renowned individuals, such as M. Furius 
Camillus or Fabius Maximus. Either way, the focus on the eminent families of republican 
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ἀλλ' εἴτε Φαβίους καὶ Σκιπίωνας καὶ Μετέλλους καὶ τοὺς κατ' αὐτὸν ἢ μικρὸν ἔμπροσθεν 
αὐτοῦ, Σύλλαν καὶ Μάριον ἀμφοτέρους τε Λευκούλλους, ἢ καὶ Πομπήϊον αὐτόν... παραβάλοι 
τις, αἱ Καίσαρος ὑπερβάλλουσι πράξεις 
But if one were to compare him with Fabii and Scipios, and Metelli, or with those who 
careers were contemporary or slightly preceded his – Sulla and Marius and the two Luculli, or 
even Pompey himself... – the deeds of Caesar are superior... (Caesar 15.3) 
βούλεσθε δὲ πυθώμεθα, τίνες ποτ' εἰσὶν οὗτοι; Φαβρίκιοί φασιν εἶναι καὶ Κάμιλλοι καὶ 
Λούκιοι [καὶ] Κικιννᾶτοι καὶ Μάξιμοι Φάβιοι καὶ Κλαύδιοι Μάρκελλοι καὶ Σκιπίωνες. ὁρῶ 
δὲ καὶ Γάιον Μάριον ... καὶ Μούκιος ἐκεῖ Σκαιόλας 
Do you wish to inquire, who these men are? They say they are Fabricii and  Camilli and Lucii 
and Cincinnati and Fabii Maximi and Claudii Marcelli and Scipios. I see also Gaius Marius... 
and there Mucius Scaevola... (De Fortuna Romanorum 317D) 
 
The chronology of the personalities Plutarch summons for the sake of comparison 
with his biographee can be extended to men of later ages. Thus, the  intensely moralising 
digression about justice in the Life of Aristides refers to quasi-timeless “kings and tyrants”: 
ὅθεν ἀνὴρ πένης καὶ δημοτικὸς ἐκτήσατο τὴν βασιλικωτάτην καὶ θειοτάτην προσηγορίαν τὸν 
Δίκαιον· ὃ τῶν βασιλέων καὶ τυράννων οὐδεὶς ἐζήλωσεν, ἀλλὰ Πολιορκηταὶ καὶ Κεραυνοὶ 
καὶ Νικάτορες, ἔνιοι δ' Ἀετοὶ καὶ Ἱέρακες ἔχαιρον προσαγορευόμενοι, τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς βίας καὶ 
τῆς δυνάμεως ὡς ἔοικε μᾶλλον ἢ τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς δόξαν ἀγαπῶντες. 
Wherefore, although poor and a man of the people, he [Aristides] acquired that most kingly and 
godlike surname of “The Just.” Which is what none of the kings and tyrants ever coveted. 
Instead they rejoiced to be called “Besiegers” and “Thunderbolts” and “Conquerors” and some 
“Eagles” and “Hawks,” embracing a repute based on violence and power, as it seems, rather 
than on virtue. (Aristides 6.2; trans. D. Sansone, modified) 
- 
The five grandiose epithets, all in the plural form, are thinly disguised references to five 
Hellenistic kings. Plutarch of course knew which sobriquet goes with which monarch — 
“Besieger” Demetrius Poliorcetes; “Thunderbolt” Ptolemy Ceraunus; “Conqueror” Seleucus 
Nicator; “Eagle” Pyrrhus; “Hawk” Antiochus Hierax8 — not to mention that he wrote 
                                                                                                                                                  
Rome implies individualized breakdown – as a potentiality, at the least! – of their 
biographical data (cf. Nep. Att. 18.3-4). We should not forget that Plutarch wrote a (lost) 
biography of Scipio Africanus (fr. 2 Sandbach); biography of Metellus Numidicus is perhaps 
hinted at in the Marius, 29.12. 
8 See, respectively, Demetr. 1.7 and 42.10-11, Py. 22.2, Cato Ma. 12.2, Py. 10.1, De soll. an. 
975B and Reg. et imp. apophth. 184A. 
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biographies of two of these kings (Demetrius and Pyrrhus). The value of this monarchs as foils 
is not so much historical as ethical.9 
There are some interesting cases when biographical synecdoche is not employed by the 
authorial voice, but is rather a reaction of the characters and ‘onlookers’ within the Plutarchan 
narrative.10 Sulla rebukes Romans for failing to discern “many Mariuses” in young Julius 
Caesar (Caesar 1.4 πολλοὺς ... Μαρίους); Brutus regrets that Antony sided with Octavian, 
thereby missing the opportunity ‘to be numbered with Bruti and Cassii and Catos’ (Brutus 
29.10). In the Life of Caesar, when the tribunes Flavius and Marullus remove the royal 
diadems from Caesar’s statues, the crowd cheers and calls them “Bruti” (Caesar 61.9 δῆμος 
... Βρούτους ἀπεκάλει τοὺς ἄνδρας). Plutarch steps in to explain that this was a reference to 
Brutus the Founding Father of the republic (61.9 ὅτι Βροῦτος ἦν ὁ καταλύσας τὴν τῶν 
βασιλέων διαδοχὴν καὶ τὸ κράτος εἰς βουλὴν καὶ δῆμον ἐκ μοναρχίας καταστήσας), but the 
analogy must still be credited to the internal audience of the scene.  Then we are told how the 
tribunes were punished and mocked by Caesar who kept calling them “bruti and Cymaeans” 
(61.10 πολλάκις βρούτους τε καὶ Κυμαίους ἀπεκάλει τοὺς ἄνδρας). Caesar’s phrase makes 
sense if it is taken to insult the tribunes as morons  by assimilating them to the proverbially 
stupid inhabitants of Cyme as well as by punning on the  adjective brutus.11 Caesar thus tries 
to de-historicise and de-biographise the dangerous reference; he needs “Bruti” to be an 
adjective instead of the pluralised name of Rome’s archetypal revolutionary – for Caesar, 
                                               
9 Cf. the strikingly similar list of royal sobriquets in the speech, ascribed to Dio of Prusa, on 
the powers of Tyche: “What should one say of those who took over his [Alexander’s] empire, 
or of those who followed after them, with their braggart titles – Thunderbolts, Besiegers, 
Eagles, Gods (τὰ ἀλαζονικὰ αὐτῶν ὀνόματα, κεραυνοὺς καὶ πολιορκητὰς καὶ ἀετοὺς καὶ 
θεούς)? One of the lot death proved mistaken; another found Fortune to be a loftier being than 
himself...” (Dio Chr. 64.22, trans. H. Lamar Crosby)   
10 On the importance of the responses of intradiegetic ‘onlookers’ across the Lives, see Pelling 
(2002) 119-20; Duff (1999) esp. 120, 152-3, 231-5 and (2011) 65-7. 
11 I follow Pelling (2011a) 458-9. Note that all the standard editions of the Greek text in 
Caes. 61.10 have Βρούτους with a capital letter. 
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bruti as “beastly blockheads” is a safer meaning, in the circumstances. Here we see 
biographical synecdoche being used as a political weapon, which Caesar seeks to parry. 
The most vibrant and far-reaching Plutarchan experiment in biographical synecdoche 
comes is found in the Life of Flamininus. It unfolds as the ruminations of anonymous Greeks 
in the immediate aftermath of Flamininus’ proclamation of Greece’s freedom at the Isthmian 
games (196 BCE).  
... σπάνιον μὲν ἀνδρεία καὶ φρόνησις ἐν ἀνθρώποις, σπανιώτατον δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν ὁ 
δίκαιος. οἱ γὰρ Ἀγησίλαοι καὶ <οἱ> Λύσανδροι καὶ οἱ Νικίαι καὶ οἱ Ἀλκιβιάδαι πολέμους μὲν 
εὖ διέπειν καὶ μάχας νικᾶν κατά τε γῆν καὶ θάλασσαν ἄρχοντες ἠπίσταντο, χρῆσθαι δὲ πρὸς 
χάριν εὐγενῆ καὶ τὸ καλὸν οἷς κατώρθουν οὐκ ἔγνωσαν, ἀλλ' εἰ τὸ Μαραθώνιόν τις ἔργον 
ἀφέλοι, καὶ τὴν ἐν Σαλαμῖνι ναυμαχίαν, καὶ Πλαταιὰς καὶ Θερμοπύλας, καὶ τὰ πρὸς 
Εὐρυμέδοντι καὶ τὰ περὶ Κύπρον Κίμωνος ἔργα, πάσας τὰς μάχας ἡ Ἑλλὰς ἐπὶ δουλείᾳ 
μεμάχηται πρὸς αὑτήν, καὶ πᾶν τρόπαιον αὐτῆς συμφορὰ καὶ ὄνειδος [ἐπ' αὐτὴν] ἕστηκε, τὰ 
πλεῖστα κακίᾳ καὶ φιλονικίᾳ τῶν ἡγουμένων περιτραπείσης. ἀλλόφυλοι δ' ἄνδρες <...> τοῖς 
μεγίστοις κινδύνοις καὶ πόνοις ἐξελόμενοι τὴν Ἑλλάδα δεσποτῶν χαλεπῶν καὶ τυράννων 
ἐλευθεροῦσι. 
... that valour and wisdom are rare things among men, but the rarest of all blessings is the just 
man. For Agesilaüses and Lysanders and Niciases and Alcibiadeses could indeed manage wars 
well and understood how to win battles by land and sea as generals, but they did not know how 
to use their successes towards noble benevolence and the good. Indeed, if one discounts the 
action at Marathon and the sea-fight at Salamis and Plataea and Thermopylae, and Cimon’s 
deeds at the Eurymedon and around Cyprus, Greece has fought all her battles with herself for 
slavery, and every one of her trophies stands as a memorial of her own calamity and disgrace: 
she was overthrown chiefly by the baseness and rivalry of her leaders. Whereas men of another 
race ...  are setting Greece free, having rescued her, at the cost of the greatest perils and 
hardships, from cruel despots and tyrants. (Flamininus 11.4-7) 
 
Here the self-destructive mind-set of the Greek nation and its morally flawed leadership are 
foregrounded by means of  pluralised household names from classical Sparta (Agesilaus, 
Lysander) and Athens (Nicias, Alcibiades). Each of them receives full-scale biographical 
treatment in the Parallel Lives. To all intents and purposes, Plutarch anchors a big historical 
generalization in the biographical tradition, which he once again handles synecdochically. 
 To sum up the argument so far: Plutarch routinely uses onomastic tags to reference 
ethico-political contexts and scenarios; the term ‘biographical synecdoche’ assists in 
capturing the essence of this operation as one that entails selection from the pool(s) of well-
known and thus biographically relevant figures. It is noteworthy  that several of Plutarch’s 
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‘mainline’ biographees feature in his lists of pluralised names; the trend peaks in Flamininus 
11.5 (four names),12 but one should add “Cimons”  (Pericles 16.3), “Marii”  (Brutus 29.6), 
“Flamininii”  (Comparison of Aristides and Cato 1.3-4), “Fabii” (Caesar 15.3),13 and the two 
Hellenistic kings  (Aristides 6.2).  
 Biographical synecdoche, in a nutshell, is about tapping the ancient biographical 
tradition in an economical way. Yet it is apparent that among the individuals Plutarch refers 
to there are ‘strong’ biographees (Cimon, Alcibiades, Lysander, Marius...) and ‘weak’ 
biographees (Cynegeirus, Ephialtus, Callicratidas, the Old Brutus, Cinna...); perhaps people 
of the latter category are not biographees at all?14 The range of Plutarchan references that are 
put to work as biographical synecdoche makes it necessary to re-visit and expand the 
parameters of biographical tradition in the Greco-Roman world.  
 
II 
At first sight, there is a gap between biographical synecdoche and biography per se.  
Plutarch employs  the names of ‘representative’ (à la Ralph Waldo Emerson) men as tags for 
demarcating large-scale historical situations and trajectories, such as political rivalry among 
the elite at Athens or Rome, the endemic conflict between the Greek states, or the rise of 
power-hungry warlords in the Late Republic. A famous name may be a handy signpost but it 
hardly has the same status as a fully-fledged biographee.  
 Having said that, the Plutarchan use of famous names does not cancel the need to 
maintain awareness of the biographical ) contents encapsulated in each onomastic tag. My 
contention is based on a twofold premise. First, it is appropriate to proceed from a broad and 
                                               
12 Also Cimon in Flam. 11.6 – understandably in the singular form, as his battles are listed 
under exceptions to the rule. 
13 Yet see n. *7*, above. 
14 With the caveat that an individual’s weak presence in the ancient biographical literature 
could be an impression contingent on survival of the sources. For instance, Cinna might have 
received coverage in Sulla’s Memoirs, on which see Smith (2009). 
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inclusive view of the Greco-Roman biographical tradition as a discursive domain that 
comprises of anecdotes and exempla as well as continuous birth-to-death narratives. The 
anecdotes are the indispensable ‘rhizome’ of biography throughout antiquity.15 A good 
anecdotal story is equally apposite in a Plutarchan Life and in texts which do not have a 
sustained biographical agenda.16 Nor does the hero of an anecdote have to be a protagonist of 
a Life; the anecdote is biographically pre-charged by default.17 Moreover, the relationship 
between anecdotes and biographical literature in antiquity is reciprocal; Menander Rhetor 
(2.138) praises Plutarch’s Lives as a resource of rhetorically suitable “tales” and sayings 
(πλήρεις ἱστοριῶν καὶ ἀποφθεγμάτων καὶ παροιμιῶν καὶ χρειῶν). Therefore, instead of 
emphasising the difference betweeen continous biographical narration and the snapshot-like 
singularity of exempla and anecdotes18 it would be rational and interpretatively rewarding to 
acknowledge the primary, ‘bedrock’ biographism in which very diverse textual engagement 
with ‘famous men’ is saturated. In the Plutarchan passages assembled in Section I (above), 
the reader is assumed to be familiar with the individuals mentioned , indeed, to be able to 
unpack the ethico-political narrative behind each name19 ― which works as kind of hyper-
                                               
15 As is richly illustrated by Hägg (2012). For the ‘rhizome’ metaphor in biography, cf. 
Davies et al. (2006) 81. Salient studies of anecdotes and exemplarity, with Roman sources 
given priority, are Saller (1980); Skidmore (1996); Pausch (2004) esp. 33-42, 164-232; 
Morgan (2007) 122-59; Bell (2008) 1-12; Barchiesi (2009); Roller (2004) and (2009). On 
Plutarch’s anecdotes see Stadter (1996) and (2008); excellent case studies abound, e.g. Beck 
(1999); Duff (2005). See also n. *25* below. 
16 E.g., Alexander’s meeting with Diogenes (Plut. Alex. 14.3-4) is elsewhere a peg for a 
lengthy inquiry into the true nature of kingship (Dio Chr. 4.14); Agesilaus’s veto on statues 
of himself (Plut. Ages. 2.4) is citable as precedent in real-life oratory: [Dio Chr.] 37.43 and 
Apul. Apol. 15.1 (Agesilai ... sententia). 
17 E.g., the story about the Thessalian tyrant Alexander becoming tearful during a tragic 
performance (Plut. Pel. 29.9-10; Ael. VH 14.40). 
18 The stance taken, more recently, by Geiger (2009) 23 and 33. 
19 Cf. Hampton (1990), 25: “... the smallest semantic unit whereby the great life is 
represented: the exemplar’s name. The reader who comes upon the name of a heroic ancient 
exemplar in a text has come upon a single sign which contains folded within it the entire 
history of the hero’s deeds, the whole string of great moments which made the name a 
marked sign in the first place. <...> the name is a noun with a verb phrase (the various great 
deeds) condensed inside it.” 
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link to the biographical tradition. Even without biographies, the owners of famous names are 
nevertheless biographees.  
Second, Plutarch is without doubt an author who works from an immanently 
‘biostructured’20 view of the past; to him, history hinges on individual statesmen. Thus, 
Rome’s civil wars are stamped with the names of the leading contestants (Otho 9.5);21 
Philopoemen is flagged as “the last of the Greeks” (Philopoemen 1.7, Aratus 24.2), which 
suggests that after him the political energy of the nation ran out; Roman imperialism, as 
perceived by the Greek ‘onlookers’, is embodied in the commanders-in-chief (Sulla 12.9-14). 
Hence, when in Plutarch the name of a great man functions as a compactreference to his 
biographically defined place in the historical context,  the biographical factor remains alive 
and potentially expandable. The prominence of biographical synecdoche in one of the most 
poignant Plutarchan digressions on Greek history (Flamininus, 11.4-7) shows that Plutarch 
does not stop thinking biographically while he wears the hat of a moralist historian.22  
 So on one level biographical synecdoche re-affirms Plutarch’s commitment to 
construing history through the lens of biography.23 At the same time it opens a fault-line 
                                               
20 The term “biostructuring” was coined by Christopher Pelling to designate how Cassius Dio 
shapes his History around the key figures (in primis, rulers) of the Empire: cf. Pelling (1997), 
(2006) 257-8. But the term neatly sums up the tenor of much imperial writing about the past: 
see e.g. Kraus (2005); Späth (2005); Pelling (2011b). Ancient readers, too, hold palpably 
biostructured expectations about history and historical fiction – cf. Maximus of Tyre, Oration 
22.5: “History is a pleasure (προσηνὲς ... ἡ ἱστορία), for it allows you to travel the world 
without effort... fighting at sea with Themistocles, in the battle line with Leonidas, making the 
crossing with Agesilaus, coming safely home with Xenophon, loving with Pantheia, hunting 
with Cyrus, ruling with Cyaxares” (trans. M. Trapp). 
21 “... the pain that the citizens inflicted on each other and suffered (δρῶντες ἀλλήλους καὶ 
πάσχοντες) because of (διὰ) Sulla and Marius, and later because of Caesar and Pompey”. Cf. 
Aristotle’s comment on historiography as reportage of particular incidents (“what Alcibiades 
did and suffered”) in the Poetics, 1451b7, 10-11. 
22 The thesis of Pelling (2010) about crystallisation of “global history” across the Parallel 
Lives is apropos too. 
23 Compare and contrast the language of tropes in the profound, if rather abstract, appraisal of 
ancient historiography vs biography by Späth (2005) 41, who argues that historiography 
deploys individuals metonymically as elements of the historical texture, whereas biography 
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within Plutarch’s overall vision of biography. Clusters of pluralised names of great, 
biographically significant  men do not sit comfortably with the principle of individuation 
which is essential to his biographical programme: 
ὥσπερ ἐπιξενούμενον ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἐν μέρει διὰ τῆς ἱστορίας ὑποδεχόμενοι καὶ 
παραλαμβάνοντες ἀναθεωρῶμεν ὅσσος ἔην οἷός τε [Hom. Il. 24.630]  
... I receive and welcome each of them in turn as my guest, so to speak, and observe “his 
stature and his qualities”... (Aemilius 1.2; trans. R. Waterfield) 
For there is surely a difference (ἔστι γὰρ ἀμέλει ... διαφορά) between the bravery of one man 
and that of another, for instance, between that of Alcibiades and that of Epaminondas; between 
the wisdom of one man and that of another, as between that of Themistocles and that of 
Aristides; between the justice of one man and that of another, as between that of Numa and that 
of Agesilaus. (Phocion. 3.7)24  
The sculptures and paintings of the Dioscuri show them to be alike, but also different in some 
respects (ὁμοιότης ἔχει τινὰ ... διαφοράν), as a boxer and a runner respectively. In the same 
way, these two young men [scil. the Gracchi] were very similar (ἐν πολλῇ ... ἐμφερείᾳ) in 
terms of their courage and self-restraint, as well as their generosity, eloquence, and high 
principles, but great differences as it were sprouted and manifested themselves (μεγάλαι ... 
οἷον ἐξήνθησαν καὶ διεφάνησαν ἀνομοιότητες) in their deeds and political courses. (Tiberius 
and.-Gaius. Gracchi. 2.1; trans. R. Waterfield, modified). 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
turns individuals into illustrative ethico-political metaphors: “Die entscheidende Differenz 
scheint mir vielmehr in der Erzäahlfunktion der Einzelfiguren zu liegen: Die 
Geschichtserzählung behandelt die Figuren metonymisch, indem sie sehr wohl deren 
Charakter narrativ ausgestaltet, aber damit eine Situierung der Figuren im Figurengeflecht der 
Akteure und in deren Handlungszusammenhang anstrebt, das ihr eigentliches Erzählthema 
ist. Die Biographie abstrahiert keineswegs von diesem Figuren- und Handlungsgeflecht, aber 
sie fokalisiert die Einzelfigur innherhalb des Geflechts und macht deren Charakter zu ihrem 
Thema und schreibt damit den Figuren der biographischen Erzählung eine metaphorische 
Bedeutung zu; sie schafft sich damit Raum, um auf allgemein-philosophische Überlegungen 
– wie politische Macht – einzugehen, die in und mit der Hauptperson illustriert werden.” 
24 Cf. Mul. virt. 243C-D: “...considering whether the magnificence of Semiramis has the same 
character and pattern (εἰ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχει χαρακτῆρα καὶ τύπον) as that of Sesostris, or the 
intelligence of Tanaquil the same as that of Servius the king, or the high spirit of Porcia the 
same as that of Brutus, or that of Pelopidas the same as Timocleia’s .... For the fact is that the 
virtues acquire certain other diversities, their own colouring as it were, due to varying natures, 
and they take on the likeness of the customs on which they are founded, and of the 
temperament of persons and their nurture and mode of living (ἐπειδὴ διαφοράς γέ τινας ἑτέρας 
ὥσπερ χροιὰς ἰδίας αἱ ἀρεταὶ διὰ τὰς φύσεις λαμβάνουσι καὶ συνεξομοιοῦνται τοῖς 
ὑποκειμένοις ἔθεσι καὶ κράσεσι σωμάτων καὶ τροφαῖς καὶ διαίταις). For example, Achilles 
was brave in one way and Ajax in another (ἄλλως ... ἄλλως), and the wisdom of Odysseus was 
not like (οὐχ ὁμοία) that of Nestor, nor was Cato a just man in exactly the same way (οὐδὲ ... 
ὡσαύτως) as Agesilaus, nor Eirene fond of her husband in the manner of Alcestis, nor Cornelia 
high-minded in the manner of Olympias.” 
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 Any given Plutarchan Life, then, can be read as  an exercise in the  individuation of 
the biographee;25  the urge to present themselves as, literally, ‘special’ and unique to the point 
of eccentricity is ascribed to some Plutarchan biographees (Themistocles 18.8 ἴδιος δέ τις ἐν 
πᾶσι βουλόμενος εἶναι; Cato Maior 25.2 ἐν παντὶ φιλοτιμούμενος περιττὸς εἶναι καὶ ἴδιος). 
But biographical synecdoche does something  very different: when a biographee’s name 
becomes an onomastic marker  for an ethico-political pattern, it is hard not to feel the shift 
away from individuation. Synecdochically processed biographees transcend their own 
biographical identity, turning into representative entities of biostructured history..   
 The problem is arguably less acute when biographical synecdoche consists of names 
in the singular form (Artaxerxes, 22.3). Pluralised names, on the other hand, seem scarcely 
compatible with the principle of biographical individuation. To put it bluntly, how unique are, 
say, Nicias or Marius if their biographical identity, of which the name is the chief sign, can be 
changed into the plural? (This is actually the tactical  reason why throughout the paper 
Plutarch’s pluralised names are transliterated as ungainly but authentic plurals...).) 
 Plutarch did not invent the practice of referencing personal names of well-known 
people in the plural. Such usage of historical but also mythological and fictional names is 
                                               
25 It is important to remember that the anecdotes, which are Plutarch’s staple material for 
biographical portrayal (cf. especially Alex. 1.2-3 “a small act... a phrase or some joke reveals 
character better”), are regularly introduced as “samples” or “symptoms” (δείγματα) of the 
biographee’s personality and/or conduct (Py. 8.3, Demetr. 4.5; Mar. 6.5, 14.3; Cic. 13.2). 
Furthermore, they can be explicitly marked up as products of synecdochic selection from the 
mass of available material:  Marc. 20.3 “I’ll mention one story out of many” (μνησθήσομαι 
δ’ ἑνὸς ἀπὸ πολλῶν), Alex. 39.1 “I’ll mention a few instances” (μνησθήσομαι δ’ ὀλίγων), 
41. 3 “I’ll set forth a few instances of this” (ὧν ὀλίγα παραθήσομαι), Ant. 4.7 “I shall relate 
... one example” (ἕν δέ τι... παράδειγμα διηγήσομαι), 10.10 “this brief episode... I offered 
by way of example, there being many” (ταῦτα... ὀλίγα πολλῶν ὄντων ἕνεκα δείγματος 
ἐξενηνόχαμεν), cf. Cic. 27.2, 38.3, Brut. 33.1. The synecdochic method behind Plutarch’s 
biographical anecdotes is underscored by Larmour (2000), 267: “Metonymy selects details 
and has parts stand for wholes; thus we grasp the character of a Plutarchan subject through a 
synecdochic understanding of a few telling incidents”; cf. generally Hampton (1990) 26. See 
also n. *40*, below. 
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attested in Greek texts before and after Plutarch;26 likewise, Latin authors are fond of 
conjuring up the names of republican stalwarts in the plural.27 What is more, not every 
pluralised name, in Plutarch has a bona fide biographical dimension. Some individuals who 
exemplify professions and non-elite social groups carry no biographical baggage; thus the list 
of entertainers around Mark Antony (Antony 24.2 “Anaxenores the lyre-players and Xuthuses 
the pipe-players and a certain actor Metrodorus...”) cannot be regarded as biographical 
synecdoche sensu proprio.28 Pluralised intellectual heroes such as philosophers are ushered in 
with minimal, if any, biographical implications: 
AUTOBULUS: ... whether it is not ridiculous to rehearse the claim that Socrateses and Platos 
were involved with vice to no milder degree than any particular slave... (De sollertia 
animalium 962B) 
 
                                               
26 E.g., Aesch. Ag. 1439 (Chryseises); Pl. Tht. 169b (Heracleses, Theseuses), Menex. 245d 
(“no Pelopses or Cadmuses or Aegyptuses or Danauses”); Joseph. In Ap. 2.154 (Lycurguses, 
Solons); adesp. ap. [Longin.] Subl. 23.3-4 (Hectors, Sarpedons); M. Aur. 7.19.1 
(Chrysippuses, Socrateses, Epictetuses); Ael. Arist. 22.8 (Philips, Alexanders, Antipaters, and 
“this whole roster of princes”, πᾶς ὁ τῶν κάτω δυναστῶν οὗτος κατάλογος), 40.17 
(Leonidases, Leotychidases, Archidamuses, Agesilauses, Agises); Max. Tyre 27.6 
(Alcibiadeses, Cleons); Pollux 4.128 (Bellerophons, Perseuses); Luc. Hermot. 5 
(Alexanders), Bis accus. 8 (Scirons, Pinebenders, Busirises, Phalarises); Ael. NA 6.61 
(Lycurguses, Solons, Zaleucuses, Charondases); Philostr. VA 6.21.6 (Solons, Lycurguses); 
Porph. De abst. 3.22 (Socrateses, Platos, Zenos); Alciphr. 4.19.10 (Theseuses); Men. Rhet. 
2.386 (Solons, Lycurguses, Minoses, Rhadamanthuses). 
27 E.g., Cic. Pro Sest. 143 (Bruti, Camilli, Ahalae, Decii, Curii, Fabricii, Maximi, Scipios, 
Lentuli, Aemilii, “and countless others”, innumerabiles alios); De Sen. 15 (Fabricii, Curii, 
Coruncanii); Verg. G. 2.169-70 (Decii, Marii, Camilli, Scipios) Val. Max. 2.1.10 (Camilli, 
Scipios, Fabricii, Marcelli, Fabii), 4.4.11 (Publicolae, Aemilii, Fabricii, Curii, Scipios, 
Scauri); Mart. 1.24.3 (Curii, Camilli), 9.27.6-7 (Curii, Camilli, Quinctii, Numae, Anci, “and 
all the other hirsute creatures we read about”, et quidquid usquam legimus pilosorum); Quint. 
IO 12.2.30 (Fabricii, Curii, Reguli, Decii, Mucii, “and countless others”, aliique 
innumerabiles). For more examples, see Jacob (1842) 204. 
28 Sometimes a modicum of biographical knowledge about the bearer of the name is still 
required, e.g. (in the singular) Amat. 753D “to marry a Thracian Habrotonon or a Milesian 
Bacchis...”: see Görgemanns (2011) 149. Hetaerae were on the radar of ancient biography: 
Power (2014) 235-41. 
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Occasionally pluralised names relate to a recurrent but all-too narrowly focused scenario that 
has little scope for synecdochic selection of biographical identities. For example, Sulla’s 
march on Rome in 83 BCE is described as follows: 
Carbones, Norbanuses, Scipios fought poorly against the advancing Sulla... (Sertorius 6.1) 
 
This list of commanders’ names is not open-ended but closely tied to a particular campaign, 
unlike most of the passages in Section I. 
 Notwithstanding exceptions, the majority of pluralised names in Plutarch belong 
under biographical synecdoche, since their job is to summon up biographees who are 
embedded in biostructured history. Yet it is precisely because biographism is so central to 
Plutarch’s work that pluralisation of personal names cannot be simply accepted as a stylistic 
technique;29 in Plutarch, biographical identities are at stake. A name in the plural form pushes 
the biographee away from individuation – towards what exactly? What kind of creature is 
Nicias in the plural? Given the fissure between individuation and pluralisation, is Plutarch’s 
biographical outlook somehow incoherent? I am going to argue to the contrary by elaborating 
the ostensibly anodyne claim, that there are tiers (as it were) to biographical individuation on 
Plutarchan terms. 
 
III 
 Biographical synecdoche, especially when it employs pluralised names, compresses 
life stories and anecdotes into brief yet culturally potent messages. Famous biographees 
                                               
29 Use of pluralised names in Greek and Latin writings (nn. *26-27*, above) is geared 
towards amplification which may be modulated in different genres and authors as sincere, 
ironic, polemical, clichéd, trivializing, and so on. Biographical synecdoche cannot be ruled 
out either (e.g., the inventory of Spartan kings in Aelius Aristides, 40.17). Fuller examination 
of the evidence falls outside the remit of this paper; see generally Jacob (1842); Katsouris 
(1977). 
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become grist to the rhetorical mill of antonomasia30 as pervasive and highly communicable 
discursive assets, or what nowadays might be conceptualised as ‘memes’.31 One should 
hesitate, however, to equate Plutarch’s onomastic pluralisation of Nicias or Marius with 
typification. The Plutarchan Lives are underwritten by a framework of moral and political 
categories,32 but this does not mean that the intended outcome is typifcation of the 
biographees. In other words, the narratives behind Plutarch’s pluralised names do not 
encourage reading such name-forms as types. And yet it is impossible not to feel that these 
pluralised names are invested with exemplarity in excess of their owners’ psychological 
profiles and careers. Plutarch allows these biographees to multiply themselves, to overrun and 
dominate swathes of biostructured history. Without losing their biographical identities, his 
Niciases, Lysanders, Marii have gone global. Maybe we ought to think of them as brands or, 
again, memes? But how would that help?  
 The way out of the quandary could begin from Christopher Pelling’s programmatic 
idea  that Plutarchan biographees are, for all their nuancedly individuated traits, “integrated” 
characters.33 So far this paper has been exploring the onomastic tags as the ‘stronger’ mode of 
Plutarchan biographical synecdoche. But Plutarch frequently enforces ‘integration’ by 
combining biographical synecdoche with a brief summation of a great man’s achievements. 
Such summations are structured  in two ways: the proper name is bracketed either with an 
                                               
30 Meyer (1995) 85-119 provides useful discussion of antonomasia from proper names. It 
must be stressed, however, that this species of antonomasia entered rhetorical theory only in 
the 1600s; the Greco-Roman theorists understood antonomasia as paraphrase of a proper 
name; see Lausberg (1960) 300-2, as well as n. *36*, below. The use of divine names in lieu 
of gods’ functions or essences (‘Mars’ for warfare, ‘Hephaestus’ for fire) was treated as 
metonymy, not antonomasia by ancient rhetoricians: Lausberg (1960) 292-3; more guardedly, 
Matzner (2016) 45-6 and 202-7. 
31 For literary and cultural studies “meme” is an attractive if  over-encompassing  term; see 
Blackmore (1999) 6-7, 65, 132, 143, 163, 232-33. 
32 See e.g., Bucher-Isler (1972); Wardman (1974) 49-57; Panagopoulos (1977); Frazier 
(1996) 101-273; Duff (1999) 72-98; Beneker (2012); Nikolaidis (2012) and (2014). 
33 Pelling (1997) 138; idem (2002) 287-97, 315-16. 
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abstraction under which the individual’s biographical performance can be classified, or with a 
word or phrase that epitomises the foremost activity or deed of that individual. Examples of 
the former approach34 in Plutarch  his observations that  Cimon (Cimon 5.1) “fell short 
neither of Miltiades in bravery, nor of Themistocles in acumen” (οὔτε γὰρ τόλμῃ Μιλτιάδου 
λειπόμενος οὔτε συνέσει Θεμιστοκλέους), that  Sertorius (Sertorius 1.10) “made himself 
equal to Metellus in experience, to Pompey in bravery, to Sulla in luck” (ἐπανίσωσεν ἑαυτὸν 
ἐμπειρίᾳ μὲν τῇ Μετέλλου, τόλμῃ δὲ τῇ Πομπηΐου, τύχῃ δὲ τῇ Σύλλα), and that  Augustus (De 
fortuna Romanorum 319E) wished for his grandson “Scipio’s courage, Pompey’s popularity, 
and his own good luck” (ἀνδρείαν μὲν ... τὴν Σκιπίωνος, εὔνοιαν δὲ τοῦ Πομπηίου, τύχην δὲ 
τὴν αὑτοῦ).35 The latter approach (which is probably more conducive to our understanding of 
the nature of biographical synecdoche) distils a life-story into a single short phrase:36 instead 
of a bare onomastic tag, we are offered a minimal narrative37 which highlights the essence of 
an individual’s life and bridges the gap between his unique biographical identity and its 
availability as example. 
Ἐπαμεινώνδᾳ λέγεις ‘μὴ στρατήγει’ καὶ Λυκούργῳ ‘μὴ νομοθέτει’ καὶ Θρασυβούλῳ ‘μὴ 
τυραννοκτόνει’ καὶ Πυθαγόρᾳ ‘μὴ παίδευε’ καὶ Σωκράτει ’μὴ διαλέγου’ 
...then you are telling Epaminondas, ‘Don’t command an army!’, and Lycurgus, ‘Don’t  
legislate!’, and Thrasybulus, ‘Don’t destroy tyrants!’, and Pythagoras, ‘Don’t educate!’,  and 
Socrates, ‘Don’t hold discussions!’... (De latenter vivendo 1128F) 
 
                                               
34 On which (Roman) declamation and Valerius Maximus thrived: see Bloomer (1992) 18, 
203-4. 
35 Cf. Apophth. Rom. 207E “Pompey’s popularity, Alexander’s bravery, and his own good 
luck” (εὔνοιαν τὴν Πομπηίου, τόλμαν δὲ τὴν Ἀλεξάνδρου, τύχην δὲ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ). 
36 This also happens to mirror the ancient idea of antonomasia; cf. Quint. IO 8.6.30: “I 
wouldn’t hesitate to say ‘the sacker of Carthage and Numantia’ for Scipio, or ‘the prince of 
Roman eloquence’ for Cicero” (trans. D. A. Russell). See further Meyer (1995) 47-84. 
37 Dio of Prusa (Oration 64.18) describes overly familiar historical examples as “those pithy 
Laconisms” (σύντομα ἐκεῖνα ...τὰ Λακωνικά). 
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 Whereas in imperial Greek rhetoric exemplary biographees are likely to end up as 
social and ethical types,38 Plutarch on the whole tends to sum up a famous biographical 
profile without ceasing to take notice of the man’s historical agency. His biographical 
summations are typically cross-references that serve to co-ordinate the corpus of his Parallel 
Lives and, crucially, to create a strongly biostructured perspective on Greco-Roman history, 
in which great men are emphatically matched with key deeds: Mummius “captured Corinth” 
(Marius 1.1); Brutus “killed Caesar” (Cato minor 73.6; Pompey 16.8); Julius Caesar is the 
man “who later became dictator” (Cicero 20.5), “by whom Pompey was overthrown” 
(Alexander 1.1), and “who years later became the greatest (μέγιστος) of Romans” (Marius 
6.4). The Life of Antony is capped with an extended and prejudiced summary of Nero’s 
career: he “killed his mother and nearly wrecked the Roman empire with his craziness” 
(Antony 87.9).39   
 For the purposes of this paper, Plutarchan summations are proof that biographical 
synecdoche in Plutarch subjects biographees to drastic integration without altogether 
cancelling their individuation. As an insider and maestro of the biographical tradition, he is 
entitled to switch between (A) richly nuanced integration of a biographee in a full-length 
narrative about that individual40 and (B) far more radical and compact synecdochic 
                                               
38 E.g. Maximus of Tyre, Oration 6.6: “... Aristides was a just man (δίκαιος), Pericles a 
virtuous man (ἀγαθὸς), and Socrates a philosopher (φιλόσοφος)” (trans. M. Trapp); Aelian, 
Historical Miscellany 4.16: “If someone looks to Callias for guidance, Callias will turn him 
into a drinker (φιλοπότην). If to Ismenias, he will become an aulos player; if to Alcibiades, an 
arrogant cheat (ἀλάζονα); if to Crobylus, a gourmet; if to Demosthenes, an orator (δεινὸν 
εἰπεῖν); if to Epaminondas, a general (στρατηγικόν); if to Agesilaus, a man of noble thoughts 
(μεγαλόφρονα); if to Phocion, a good man (χρηστόν); if to Aristides, a just man (δίκαιον); if to 
Socrates, a wise man (σοφόν).” (trans. N. G. Wilson). 
39 ἀπέκτεινε τὴν μητέρα καὶ μικρὸν ἐδέησεν ὑπ' ἐμπληξίας καὶ παραφροσύνης ἀνατρέψαι τὴν 
Ῥωμαίων ἡγεμονίαν. A Life of Nero (Νέρωνος βίος) is listed amongst Plutarch’s lost works 
(Lamprias Catalogue, no. 30). 
40 Yet synecdochically selected anecdotes and characteristics also have the potential to 
destabilise biographical narrative, resulting in fragmentation rather than integration of the 
biographee’s identity. Cf. Larmour (2000) 276: “Metonymy... threatens, like the sea, to 
overwhelm the coherence the text is seeking to establish with its profusion of details, its 
~ 18 ~ 
 
integration within the broad-brush tableau of biostructured history. In fact, the analogy, 
which is important to Plutarch, between biographical narration and visual arts might help to 
appreciate the dynamics between (A) and (B). For biographical synecdoche gravitates 
towards exemplum; while the objective of a literary exemplum is to depict a hero in his single 
most iconic moment, a case can be made that quite a few visual representations in antiquity 
aspired to do the same.41 The strongly integrated biographical identities in Plutarchan 
onomastic tags and summations are akin to such representations: it may not be completely 
serendipitous that the virtuous character of Callicratidas, who in Artaxexes, 22.3 is offered as 
synecdochic representative of heroic Sparta, in the Life of Lysander is likened to a statue (5.8 
ὥσπερ ἀγάλματος ἡρωικοῦ).42 But Plutarch also espouses parallelism between his own life 
writing and portraiture (Alex. 1.3; Cim. 2.2-5).43 Carefully detailed and intensely individuated 
portrayal of biographical identities realizes integrated characterisation in the in-depth mode. 
Biographical synecdoche and biographical narrative are anything but incompatible, then; 
Plutarch makes sure that the two policies for doing biography reinforce each other. Pursing 
the visual-textual analogy further, we can, I think, finally pin down those pluralised names. 
                                                                                                                                                  
contradiction and ambiguities, its lack of closure, and its digressive trail.” By dint of 
synecdoche, biographical details can be re-framed ironically and subversively. Consider the 
series of tongue-in-cheek exempla in Martial’s epigram (2.89.1-5): “You enjoy stretching the 
evening with overmuch wine. That I forgive; you have Cato’s bad habit (uitium... 
Catonis), Gaurus. You write verses without Apollo and the Muses. You deserve praise; this 
habit you have of Cicero’s. Your vomiting: a way of Antony’s...”  (trans. D. R. Shackleton 
Bailey). The epigram is having fun with warped biographical summations, i.e. close-ups of 
flaws which are indeed on record for Cato, Cicero, and Antony (Plut. Cato mi. 6.2-3; Cic. 
2.3-5; Ant. 9.6) but would not immediately qualify as their axial, life-profiling flaws – albeit 
Antony’s vomit is somewhat more emblematic of his narrative than alcoholism is of Cato’s or 
poetastery of Cicero’s. 
 
41 Geiger (2009) 34, 88. The best Plutarchan example is the statue of the Old Brutus with his 
sword drawn (Brutus 1.1); see incisive comments by Mossman (1999) 111. 
42 Mossman (1991) 114-15; Duff (1999) 168-71 
43 Duff (1999) 16-17; Hirsch-Luipold (2002) 41-50; Kaesser (2004); Geiger (2009) 200-201; 
Hägg (2012) 271-72. Cf. also the stimulating essay by Ní Dhúill (2009). 
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They are portraits, too, yet mass-reproduced portraits – think posters or, better, coinage 
imagery: after all, this is Plutarch’s currency for negotiating the biostructured past. 
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